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Abstract
Background: The incidence of cancer and the cost of its treatment continue to rise. The effect of these dual forces is a
major burden on the system of health care financing. One cost containment approach involves changing the way
physicians are paid. Payers are testing reimbursement methods such as capitation and prospective payment while also
evaluating how the changes impact health outcomes, resource utilization, and quality of care. The purpose of this study is
to identify evidence related to physician payment methods’ impacts, with a focus on cancer control.
Methods: We conducted a rapid review. This involved defining eligibility criteria, identifying a search strategy, performing
study selection according to the eligibility criteria, and abstracting data from included studies. This process was
accompanied by a gray literature search for special topics.
Results: The incentives in fee-for-service payment systems generally lead to health care services being applied
inconsistently because providers practice independently with few systems in place for developing treatment protocols
and practice reviews. This inconsistency is pronounced in cancer care because much of the total per patient spending
occurs in the last month of life. Some insurers are predicting that this variation can be reduced through the use of
prospective or bundled payments combined with decision support systems. Workload, recruitment, and retention are all
affected by changes to physician payment models; effects seem to be magnified in the specialist context as their several
extra years of training lower their overall supply.
Conclusions: Experimentation with physician payment methods has tended to neglect cancer care providers.
Policymakers designing cancer-focused physician reimbursement pilot programs should incorporate quality measurement
since very ill patients may receive too little treatment when payment models do not cover oncologists’ total costs, e.g.,
fee-for-service systems whose prices do not account for the possible presence of other diseases.
Keywords: Physician reimbursement, Physician payment, Oncology, Fee-for-service, Salary, Capitation, Activity-based
funding, Prospective payment, Pay for performance, Payment by results
Background
Cancer is a leading cause of morbidity and mortality in
Canada. In addition to human suffering, cancer annually
costs the health system an estimated C$4 billion and is
the largest contributor to lost economic productivity [1].
This trend will not abate, with incident cases in British
Columbia (BC) expected to increase by 57 % between
2012 and 2030 [2]. Providing high-quality care to
patients that is also cost-effective is an ongoing
challenge for cancer control. Policymakers face the chal-
lenge to control cost as increases in health care spending
put pressure on other government priorities such as
education and defense. Since labor costs account for
15 % of health care budgets in Canada [3], payers are
exploring how they might contain costs by critically
evaluating the way physicians are paid and how changes
in payment method will affect health outcomes, resource
utilization, and quality of care.
Physicians are tasked to deliver care that maximizes pa-
tient benefit. Information asymmetry in medical treatment
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requires principals (e.g., third-party payers; patients) to
rely on agents (e.g., physicians) to recommend and com-
municate the consequences of alternative courses of ac-
tion [4]. Agents must be incentivized to maximize benefits
to patients, rather than solely to the agent’s own benefit.
In their most basic form, financial incentives from remu-
neration are created through transferring money from the
principals to the agent to provide care at a specified level
of quality. Economic theory suggests that incentives may
be used to reduce the marginal cost of physician behavior
change, e.g., increasing adherence to evidence-based
guidelines [5]. If the size of the monetary incentive is
greater than the cost for the physician changing their
behavior, the profit (or portion thereof) may be used as a
reward to the physician. The magnitude of change and
direction of behavioral response (i.e., incentive vs. disin-
centive) will depend on a number of factors, including the
characteristics of the incentive payment method and the
financial and opportunity costs of participating in incen-
tive schemes. These factors are important because poorly
designed incentives may have unintended behavioral ef-
fects and lead to lower levels of quality, e.g., if an overly
large payment wrongly signals high risk [6].
Major payment methods
There are two primary attributes of physician remuneration
that influence the magnitude and direction of physician be-
havior response: method of payment and level of payment
[7]. Payment methods include capitation, fee-for-service,
performance-based payment, prospective payment, and/or
salary. The timing of the payment can be prospective, i.e.,
set in advance according to a fixed budget, or retrospective
with or without a cap on total payments that are made.
The second attribute, payment level, may be fixed in ad-
vance or subject to negotiation after care is delivered. Al-
ternatively, physicians may have complete or partial
discretion as to the amount of money charged for services.
The amount of payment for physician services may be
reduced or withheld if behavior does not conform to
benefit-maximizing requirements. Finally, the amount
may vary depending on characteristics of the provider or
patients seen (e.g., more complex cases receive higher pay-
ments). Table 1 provides an overview of each category of
payment method, including the terms associated with the
payment approach, the definition of each category and the
potential benefits and harms of the payment approaches.
In the United States (US), most recent reforms aiming
to change the way health care is funded have focused on
hospital payment, for example using global budgets,
shared savings programs, penalties for readmissions, and
hospital-acquired conditions, rather than changing the
way providers are paid [8]. However, the 2015 Medicare
Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act offers Medicare
patients’ physicians a choice of payment models, e.g.,
participating in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment
System, which starting in 2019 will adjust a provider’s
fee-for-service reimbursement up or down based on pro-
vider performance on quality measures that are currently
being developed [9]. In Canada, activity-based funding
for hospitals have been implemented in at least three
provinces, with most physicians receiving some form of
blended payment, followed by fee-for-service [10].
Payment method impacts
The impacts of provider payment methods have been
extensively evaluated. For example, researchers have
found some correlation between the fee-for-service
payment model and increased use of tests [11]. They
note that higher service use does not necessarily im-
prove outcomes and may even be harmful. Changes
from fee-for-service to capitated payment models have
also been studied several times. This change does not
appear to cause problematic decreases in primary care
access [12], but does not decrease hospital use [13].
The use of prospective payment may increase the rate
of hospital readmissions and adverse events, but this in-
crease is related to hospitals assigning more severe diag-
noses to patients under prospective payment than they
would under other systems [14]. This means that the
hospital is allocated more funding, although direct treat-
ment costs have not increased.
Cash bonuses have been demonstrated to improve some
outcomes—vaccination rates, for example—but researchers
caution that the improvement observed may be due to bet-
ter reporting rather than true practice change [15]. The re-
search indicates that combining payment model changes
with other interventions such as educational campaigns may
be needed to make meaningful practice changes [15].
Provider payment reforms such as accountable care
organization (ACO) shared savings programs encourage
providers to form groups and assume responsibility for the
care of a population of patients in order to share in payer
savings if quality and cost performance benchmarks are
achieved. However, a 2001 study found that forming these
groups had no significant effect on factors such as improved
care coordination and innovation. The authors hypothesized
that this may be because the groups did not identify as cohe-
sive entities and used the structure mainly for legal purposes
rather than to improve care provision [16].
Broadly, existing evidence suggests that changes in
physician behaviors have the potential to impact the cost
and quality of care provided. Payment method can also
influence recruitment and retention of physicians, which
in turn impacts patient access and quality of care [17].
Object of the document
Previous reviews [18–21] have evaluated the impact of
different payment methods on cost and quality of care,
McPherson et al. Systematic Reviews  (2016) 5:160 Page 2 of 15
but none have focused specifically on the cancer care
context. Across Canada, oncology remuneration takes
several different forms. Sourced from the 2013 National
Physician Survey [22], Fig. 1 shows that salary is the
most common remuneration method for medical oncol-
ogists (37.7 % of respondents); other methods reported
are fee-for-service (17.8 %), “sessional/per diem” (3.9 %),
none of these (1.2 %), and a blend of these methods
(32.4 %). No oncologists reported payment by capitation
or “incentives and premiums”.
The objective of this study is to undertake a rapid re-
view of the literature—a database search combined with
a hand search of several systematic reviews and the gray
literature—to explore the impact of physician payment
methods on patient outcomes, care quality, and overall
expenditure, with a specific focus on cancer control in
Canada.
Methods
We followed guidelines for performing a rapid literature
review [23], which included defining eligibility criteria,
identifying a search strategy, performing study selection
according to the eligibility criteria, and abstracting data;
this was followed up by an ancillary search for special
topics. These searches were conducted in June 2015.
Eligibility criteria
We set out to include all studies published in English pub-
lished in the past 10 years, regardless of whether they were
original analyses or reviews of past work. We defined
“impact” as the consequences of physician payment
methods on health services use, expenditures, health out-
comes, physician retention, and stakeholder opinion. We
excluded abstracts, editorials, letters, and news.
Search strategies
We worked with a senior librarian at the BC Cancer
Agency to help identify subject headings and keywords.
We also identified search terms and keywords from key
background articles.
Studies were identified through bibliographic searches
of the MEDLINE, Embase, and Evidence Based Medicine
Table 1 Overview of physician payment approaches
Payment model Definition Potential benefits and harms
Capitation; pre-payment Providers are paid a set amount for each
person enrolled with them regardless of
whether the person receives care.
May reduce unnecessary health services utilization since
payment is not tied to service provision. It is argued the
financial incentives in capitation will lead primary care
physicians to reduce referrals to specialists [12]. However,
some argue that providers may be incentivized to develop
overly long lists and actually refer to specialist care too
frequently [33].
Fee-for-service Providers are paid separately for all
medical services delivered
In this method, providers are reimbursed for all medical
services they provide, lowering the risk of taking on patients
who need many services. However, appointments may be
limited to one service and complicated patients may require
many appointments. This method may also increase the use
of services which can give diminishing marginal returns or
even have detrimental effects [33] and incentivize the
over-delivery of care because it rewards increases
in service volume, regardless of health benefit [11].




Providers receive different payments for
meeting or missing performance
benchmarks, e.g., related to quality,
efficiency, care integration [8].
Incentives based on achieving quality objectives are
expected to be associated with behaviors designed
to achieve the quality targets, e.g., immunization rates,
mammography screening, patient satisfaction scores [16].
Risk adjustment algorithms should be employed so
that organizations are not penalized for treating sicker patients.
Prospective payment; activity-based
funding; bundled payment; lump-sum
payment; block funding; clinical pathways
A fixed payment for each patient,
based only on the patient’s diagnosis
May reduce clinical variation and end-of-life costs [40].
However, without a focus on quality measurement, the
pressures of these systems may place perverse incentives
on providers to deliver less care [51]. The development
of “clinical pathways” (management plans that address
quality by providing the sequence and timing of actions
covered by the associated lump sum payment [55]) aims
to address this issue.
Salary Individual providers get a fixed fee
per year regardless of the number
of patients they treat
Similar to capitation, this method may have utilization
lowering effects. However, care quality may be compromised if
providers respond to fixed payment by working shorter hours
and being less responsive to their patients’ needs and
demands [56].
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Reviews publication databases using the following terms








 Pay for performance
 Payment by results








Under the guidance of the librarian, we undertook an
iterative process to customize and refine the search
strategy. Table 2 presents the full search strategies for
each database. Although the strategies contain state-
ments that emphasize results specific to Canada, these
are combined with other statements that use “or”; as
such, the search has no regional limitation.
Gray literature search
We also undertook a gray literature search. This was lim-
ited to oncology in Canada for time and scope reasons.
We searched abstracts contained in the Canadian Health
Human Resources Network online library [24], as well as
websites for the following organizations:
 Canadian Association of Medical Oncologists [25]
 Canadian Association of Radiation Oncologists [26]
 Canadian Foundation for Healthcare Improvement [27]
 Canadian Institute for Health Information [28]
 Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences [29]
 National Physicians Survey [22]
 Statistics Canada [30]
Study selection and data abstraction
One reviewer conducted screening. Initially, we reviewed
article titles and abstracts for relevance; the full text of arti-
cles that appeared to be potentially eligible were subse-
quently reviewed for inclusion. EM abstracted the following
data from each included article: authors, publication date,
country, title, payment approach, health issue, outcomes
measured, research methods, and study findings. We
worked closely with a senior librarian who helped design
and calibrate the search strategies presented in full in
Table 2. In-duplicate data extraction and post hoc data ex-
traction review were not performed. We encourage future
Fig. 1 Medical oncologist responses to 2013 National Physicians Survey [22] question 6a on remuneration method (percentage of total)
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Table 2 Search strategies by database
MEDLINE
1 payment by results.mp. 132
2 activity based funding.mp. 34
3 prospective payment.mp. 2471
4 results based purchasing.mp. 0
5 pay for performance.mp. 1388
6 value based purchasing.mp. 406
7 performance based payment.mp. 32
8 Value-Based Purchasing/ 221
9 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 4376
10 (salar* or cash or funding or remunerat*
or reimburs* or capitation).m_titl.
10,331
11 exp reimbursement mechanisms/or
exp fee-for-service plans/or exp
prospective payment system/
19,943
12 exp “Fees and Charges”/ 14,265
13 economics, medical/or fees, medical/or
exp Economics, Dental/
4119
14 exp Income/ 30,587
15 “costs and cost analysis”/ 17,763
16 exp models, economic/ 9415
17 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 91,620
18 Physician Incentive Plans/ 1686
19 exp Physicians/ec [Economics] 2901
20 economics, medical/or fees, medical/ 3308
21 Physician’s Practice Patterns/ 38,532
22 “episode of care”/ 1314
23 Patient Care Bundles/ 53
24 (physician* adj3 (remunerat* or reimburs*
or payment*)).mp. [mp = title, abstract, original
title, name of substance word, subject heading
word, keyword heading word, protocol
supplementary concept word, rare disease
supplementary concept word, unique identifier]
1082
25 exp reimbursement mechanisms/or exp
fee-for-service plans/or exp prospective
payment system/
19,943
26 exp health personnel/ec 8622
27 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 70,140
28 exp Neoplasms/ 1,465,616
29 medical oncology/or radiation oncology/ 12,921
30 exp Antineoplastic Agents/ 503,154
31 Cancer Care Facilities/ 2772
32 Oncology Nursing/or Oncology Service, Hospital/ 6186
33 (cancer* or oncolog* or chemotherap*
or radiotherap* or radiation therap*).m_titl.
549,429
34 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 1,800,023
35 17 and 27 and 34 983
36 exp Canada/ 77,345
Table 2 Search strategies by database (Continued)
37 (canad* or british columbia or alberta
or ontario or quebec or manitoba or
saskatchewan or nova scotia or new
brunswick or newfoundland or prince
edward island).mp. [mp = title, abstract,
original title, name of substance word,
subject heading word, keyword heading
word, protocol supplementary concept
word, rare disease supplementary concept
word, unique identifier]
118,540
38 36 or 37 118,680
39 27 and 34 and 38 285
40 9 and (10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16)
and 27 and 34
47
41 9 and 27 and 34 50
42 9 and 34 99
43 9 and 27 and 38 39
44 9 and 34 and 38 4
45 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 419
46 limit 45 to yr = “2005 -Current” 286
47 limit 46 to english language 275
Embase
Embase <1974 to 2015 May 14>
# Search statement Results
1 payment by results.mp. 253
2 activity based funding.mp. 58
3 prospective payment.mp. 8724
4 results based purchasing.mp. 0
5 pay for performance.mp. 1859
6 value based purchasing.mp. 320
7 performance based payment.mp. 43
8 Value-Based Purchasing/ 2810
9 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 13,742
10 (salar* or cash or funding or remunerat*
or reimburs* or capitation).m_titl.
18,835
11 exp reimbursement mechanisms/or exp
fee-for-service plans/or exp prospective
payment system/
55,981
12 exp “Fees and Charges”/ 35,171
13 economics, medical/or fees, medical/or
exp Economics, Dental/
651,978
14 exp Income/ 71,061
15 “costs and cost analysis”/ 53,721
16 exp models, economic/ 115,183
17 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 857,409
18 Physician Incentive Plans/ 51,522
19 exp Physicians/ec [Economics] 0
20 economics, medical/or fees, medical/ 45,653
21 Physician’s Practice Patterns/ 183,699
22 “episode of care”/ 209,403
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reviews of this literature body that employ full systematic
review methods to include these activities.
Study acquisition flow
Figure 2 presents the acquisition flow of included studies
from the database search. Of 711 citations identified by
the database search, ten addressed the impact of
physician payment methods on quality or access to care,
equity, cost, or efficiency in the context of oncology. Al-
though we are specifically interested in the effect of pay-
ment methods in the Canadian context, the relative
paucity of studies encouraged us to include research
conducted outside Canada. Barring major contextual dif-
ferences, payment method effects should be similar
across jurisdictions. Additional file 1 contains our popu-
lated PRISMA checklist.
Results
This section reviews the findings of the articles returned
by the database search and the ancillary search. A sub-
section highlights the research methods used to evaluate
the consequences of physician payment methods.
Table 2 Search strategies by database (Continued)
23 Patient Care Bundles/ 188
24 (physician* adj3 (remunerat* or reimburs*
or payment*)).mp. [mp = title, abstract,
subject headings, heading word, drug
trade name, original title, device
manufacturer, drug manufacturer,
device trade name, keyword]
5896
25 exp reimbursement mechanisms/or
exp fee-for-service plans/or exp
prospective payment system/
55,981
26 exp health personnel/ec 0
27 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23
or 24 or 25 or 26
506,044
28 exp Neoplasms/ 3,504,879
29 medical oncology/or radiation oncology/ 108,563
30 exp Antineoplastic Agents/ 1,565,429
31 Cancer Care Facilities/ 19,458
32 Oncology Nursing/or Oncology Service, Hospital/ 25,476
33 (cancer* or oncolog* or chemotherap*
or radiotherap* or radiation therap*).m_titl.
1,058,603
34 28 or 29 or 30 or 31 or 32 or 33 4,403,463
35 17 and 27 and 34 12,766
36 exp Canada/ 136,398
37 (canad* or british columbia or alberta
or ontario or quebec or manitoba or
saskatchewan or nova scotia or new
brunswick or newfoundland or prince
edward island).mp. [mp = title, abstract,
subject headings, heading word, drug
trade name, original title, device
manufacturer, drug manufacturer,
device trade name, keyword]
228,077
38 36 or 37 228,077
39 27 and 34 and 38 1648
40 9 and (10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14
or 15 or 16) and 27 and 34
367
41 9 and 27 and 34 382
42 9 and 34 554
43 9 and 27 and 38 118
44 9 and 34 and 38 14
45 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 2304
46 limit 45 to yr = “2005 -Current” 1833
47 limit 46 to english language 1788
48 “health policy economics and management”.ec. 504,366
49 47 and 48 416
50 (physician* and (fee or fees or pay*
or remunerat* or compensat*
or purchas* or reimburs*)).m_titl.
2372
51 limit 50 to (english language and
yr = “2005 -Current”)
694
52 49 or 51 1104
53 limit 52 to yr = “2013 -Current” 291
Table 2 Search strategies by database (Continued)
54 47 and physician*.mp. and (fee or fees
or pay* or remunerat* or compensat*
or purchas* or reimburs*).mp. [mp = title,
abstract, subject headings, heading word,
drug trade name, original title, device
manufacturer, drug manufacturer,
device trade name, keyword]
151
55 52 or 54 1177
56 limit 55 to exclude medline journals 85
57 53 or 56 352
58 remove duplicates from 57 342
EBM Reviews
EBM Reviews - Cochrane Database of
Systematic Reviews <2005 to December 2014>
# Search statement Results
1 (Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation
of Care Group).mp. [mp = title, short title,
abstract, full text, keywords, caption text]
91
2 1 and (canad* or british columbia).ti, kw. 0
3 1 and (cancer* or oncolog* or neoplasms
or tumor* or tumour* or chronic).ti,kw.
3
4 1 and (physician* or specialit* or specialt*
or dentist* or cost* or financ* or econom*
or fees or reimburs* or pay* or salar* or
remunerat* or fund* or cash or incentive*or
bundle* or performance or capitation or
pattern* or episode*).ti, kw.
25
5 remunerat*.ti, kw. 1
6 3 or 4 or 5 28
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Study characteristics
Table 3 presents the key characteristics of the database
search articles according to geographical location of
study, study design, sampling method, and sample size.
The majority of included articles were from the US and
three studies were from Canada. Study designs included
a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches, includ-
ing observational studies (using administrative data-
bases) [6, 12–14, 31, 32], literature reviews [11, 33–36],
semi-structured interviews [37], and collection survey
[15, 38–40]. Table 4 shows which payment methods
each article discusses.
Articles identified from the database search
Table 5 summarizes the key attributes of the ten articles
identified through the database search examining physician
remuneration in oncology. Four articles [11, 35, 36, 41] are
based on literature reviews or commentary. As such, the
findings may not be unique to the article.
Habermann et al. [31] used data from the Medicare
cancer registry (part of the National Cancer Institute’s
Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results project) to
compare breast cancer screening rates in health main-
tenance organizations (HMOs) with rates for providers
reimbursed by fee-for-service. (Physicians practicing in
HMOs are normally reimbursed through capitation
[42]). Health maintenance organizations and managed
care generally tend to use more resources at the begin-
ning of the care process, e.g., performing preventive
care, in order to keep people healthier and also save
money in the long run [43]. Cancer stage at diagnosis, a
proxy for screening rate, was estimated using a logistic
regression model that adjusted for payment method as
well as demographic variables. The authors found that
women enrolled in health maintenance organizations
were more likely than those in fee-for-service to be
diagnosed early (and therefore likely to have received
screening), both before and after a change from biennial
to annual mammograms. However, this difference de-
creased by half after the move to annual screening.
Elit [36] analyzed the events that led to a change in pay-
ment method for Ontario-based gynecologic oncologists
by conducting a non-systematic search of academic and
gray literature and also speaking to key stakeholders in-
cluding university physicians and members of the Ontario
Medical Association. She found that most of the
province’s gynecologic oncologists changed from fee-for-
service remuneration to the salary-based program offered
in 2001 because they reported that prices in Ontario’s fee-
for-service payment model did not account for the fact
that non-oncology procedures are often more costly when
performed on cancer patients. Study participants noted
Fig. 2 Study acquisition flow from database search
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that the situation had encouraged specialists to focus on
uncomplicated cases. Under-reimbursement had also
hampered the recruitment and retention of specialized
staff, but retention was improved when the alternative
program of salary payment was offered.
In a related study, Elit and Cosby [37] conducted
qualitative interviews which explored the impact on
gynecologic oncologists of switching from fee-for-service
to the alternative salary-based plan described above.
They recruited 14 gynecologic oncologists from five
practice sites in Ontario, four of which had opted for the
change from fee-for-service to salary. A semi-structured
interview guide designed for the study was used in the
interviews; it consisted of professional and personal
questions. The interviewed physicians who experienced
the remuneration change reported improvements in
their own quality of life and income predictability, while
also noting that their preventive care work had in-
creased. They noted that practice site vacancies were
able to be filled and staff were able to be retained. It had
been hoped that the new program would also reduce
physician workload, but the interviewees stated this had
not occurred. However, interviewees affirmed that
follow-up for less complicated patients was now being
appropriately delegated.
Newcomer et al. [44] describe a pilot project where
physicians at five medical oncology groups in the US
were reimbursed with a single episode payment for all
breast, colon, and lung cancer patients at their initial
visit. All other physician services continued to be reim-
bursed via the existing fee-for-service contract. The
study design compared the operational and control co-
horts during the pre-pilot and pilot time periods. In the
analysis, 810 patients were used. Data included clinical
data corresponding to characteristic of episode payments
(cancer type, stage, genetic profile), the total medical
cost per episode of care (a linear regression function of
the episode payment condition, age, and sex), and
chemotherapy drug cost (average sale price). Controls
were obtained from UnitedHealthcare’s registry of more
than 65,000 breast, colon, and lung cancer patients. The
net savings in total medical cost for the episode cohort
compared to fee-for-service was $33.4 million. Although
the program contained several incentives to lower drug
costs, chemotherapy drug spending unexpectedly rose; it
totaled $13.5 million more than predicted at $21 million.
The authors state the study was not sufficiently powered
to analyze which expenses disproportionately impacted
the differences in total medical cost.
Offering expert commentary on the Medicare pro-
gram’s reimbursement for chemotherapy services, Bailes
and Coleman [35] argue that Medicare’s fee-for-service
payment system has tended to underestimate the total
cost of chemotherapy treatment. The authors state that
reimbursement for products and services used in the ad-
ministration of chemotherapy drugs has often been sub-
stantially less than their true cost. To cover the
administration resource shortfall, they note that oncolo-
gists have relied on marginal profit from drug reim-
bursement [45]. Decreases in drug payments brought in
by the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act have resulted
in losses for some oncologists. However, they note that
the 2010 Affordable Care Act includes funding for pilot
programs to “align nationally recognized, evidence-based
guidelines of cancer care with payment incentives … in
the areas of treatment planning and follow-up care plan-
ning” [46].
Turning to pay for performance, Kuo et al. [32] con-
ducted a retrospective analysis of breast cancer care
examining a program targeted at hospitals which re-
wards better patient outcomes with a bundled payment,
which encompasses treatment options based on recom-
mended treatment plan for the breast cancer stage. This
payment is higher than in the original payment scheme
(case-based for surgery and fee-for-service for other
treatment components) when the treatment plan is
followed, lower when it is not. The authors note that at-
tending physicians in Taiwan are mainly employed by
hospitals, so financial incentives applied at the hospital
Table 3 Characteristics of the identified articles from the
database search











Statistical analysis 3 (regression analysis)
Sampling method
Random 0






100 < n < 1000 1
>1000 2
Not applicable 4
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level may still directly impact physician behavior. Data
came from the Taiwan Cancer Database. Women diag-
nosed in 2003 or 2004 with stage I or II breast cancer
were included. The association of program participation
and quality of care was estimated using linear regression
and controlling for age, stage, comorbidity, and type of
surgery. Results showed that patients treated at hospitals
participating in the pay-for-performance program re-
ceived higher-quality care, achieved better 5-year overall
survival, and experienced less recurrence [30].
Makari-Judson et al. [47] document the experience of
a group of 11 hematologic oncologists who were offered
performance-based incentives in five categories (with as-
sociated outcome in parentheses): patient-centered goals
(measured by the patients’ medical record), quality mea-
sures (Quality Oncology Practice Initiative metrics), clin-
ical productivity (work relative value units), academic
(not specified), and the group’s overall financial perform-
ance (not specified). Incentives were arranged in three
tiers; each corresponded to a category score and
triggered a bonus (percentage of salary). The authors re-
port results for two of the five measures: patient-
centered goals and quality measures. For the latter, “Tier
III” was achieved resulting in a bonus of 24 %. For the
former, no bonus was achieved.
Greenapple [40] conducted an online survey of 49
American health insurers, representing more than 100
million covered individuals, which asked them about the
models of care that they are implementing or would
support in order to improve cancer care quality and also
control cost. The survey results reveal that the payers
most favored systems of “clinical pathways”, a specialized
form of care bundle where an evidence-based algorithm
guides care practice for a defined group of patients



























Patel et al. 
2013
Total 2 (20%) 8 (80%) 4 (40%) 5 (50%) 1 (10%) 1 (10%)
The shaded area indicates that the article in a given row discusses the payment method listed in the corresponding column header
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Table 5 Database search articles
Authors Title Payment approach Methods Health issue Outcomes measured Findings
Bailes JS and Coleman
TS. 2014 (USA)
The long battle over payment
for oncology services in the
office setting [35]
Fee-for-service Reviews Medicare policy








much less than its cost.
Marginal revenue from
drug payments is used
to make up the difference,
and drug payment decreases
could result in provider losses.
Bekelman JE, Epstein
AJ and Emanuel EJ.
2014 (USA)
Getting the next version of
payment policy “right” on the













incentives. For complex cases
lump sum payment could be
combined with fee-for-service.
Elit, L. 2006 (Canada) An analysis of alternative
funding for physicians
practicing gynecologic
oncology in Ontario, Canada














account for the increased










Does shifting a physician
payment system shift physician
priorities? A multi-site
evaluation of an alternative
payment plan (APP) for gynecologic
oncologists in Ontario [37]
Fee-for-service vs. a
negotiated arrangement
where contracts are made
with physician groups who
are paid a fixed amount
regardless of productivity









to the new payment
system
The new plan improved
quality of life and income
predictability, increased
preventive health care work.
Vacancies were filled and
staff were retained. Staff
delegated follow-up with less
complicated patients. The
plan did not reduce workload.
Greenapple R. 2013
(USA)
Rapid expansion of new oncology
care delivery payment models:
results from a payer survey [40]
Comparing “clinical pathways”
(bundled payments with quality
management), capitation, shared
savings and pay-for-performance




payers about models of
care that could improve
quality and reduce costs.
Cancer care Payer perceptions of
which payment models
are most effective
Payers believe that clinical
pathways can reduce clinical
variation in care, improve




BA, Riley GF, and
Baxter NN. 2007 (USA)
The Impact of a Change in
Medicare Reimbursement Policy
and HEDIS Measures on Stage at
Diagnosis Among Medicare HMO





Compares the effect of
change from biennial to
annual mammograms by
payment method.
Breast cancer Surveillance Epidemiology
and End Results, Medicare
claims database
Women enrolled in the health
maintenance organization
were more likely than those
in fee-for-service to be
diagnosed early both before
and after the, but after the
change, the disparity shrank













Table 5 Database search articles (Continued)
Kuo RN, Chung KP
and Lai MS. 2011
(China)
Effect of the pay-for-performance





therapy and reward better pa-
tient outcomes)






enrollment and quality of
care.




quality care, had better
5-year overall survival and
less recurrence
Makari-Judson G,




Using Quality Oncology Practice
Initiative Metrics for Physician
Incentive Compensation
Pay for performance Based on their
performance in five
achievement categories,
physicians were offered a
bonus percentage of
salary corresponding to
the target level achieved.
Hematology
oncology





academic goals and the
overall financial success
of the group
Results are reported for two
measures: quality and
emotional well-being. For the
former, “Tier III” was achieved
resulting in a bonus of 24 %
salary. For the latter no bonus
was achieved.
Newcomer LN, Gould
B, Page RD, Donelan
SA and Perkins M.
2014 (USA)
Changing Physician Incentives
for Affordable, Quality Cancer




Physicians at five medical
oncology groups were
reimbursed with a single
episode payment for
services to cancer patients
as part of a pilot program.
The episode cohort was













The total medical cost for the
episode cohort was $33.4
million less than what was
predicted using fee-for-service.







payments), pay for performance,
fee-for-service
Reviews pilot initiatives in




Cancer care Research on oncology

























during a set period of time [45]. They believe that these
could reduce both the cost of end-of-life care and clin-
ical variation in care, while also improving care quality.
The payers prioritize controlling costs through the
method of reducing wasteful and inappropriate care and
believe that clinical pathways are most likely to achieve
such reductions.
In an expert commentary, Patel et al. [41] review pilot ini-
tiatives in the US that combine oncologist payment reforms
with delivery reforms, including performance incentives,
bundled payment and clinical pathways, and mixed
methods, i.e., a fee-for-service chemotherapy payment for
the cost of buying the drug, fixed payments for drug ad-
ministration and care management. They propose a phys-
ician payment model for cancer care that combines fee-for-
service payment with case management payment (to lower
the incentive to increase the volume and intensity of patient
services) and a care coordination fee. This would involve
increasing total payment to physicians but could decrease
the total cost of cancer care (by decreasing waste and ineffi-
ciency, as well as payments for all other cancer care).
Bekelman et al. [11] use academic literature and
public-sector publications to make evidence-based rec-
ommendations on reforms to cancer care payment pol-
icy. They argue that any prospective payment systems
should focus on performance measurement, since theory
predicts that lump sum payment systems will place per-
verse incentives on providers, e.g., providing too few ser-
vices to very ill patients [6]. The authors recommend a
strategy of cross-subsidizing with fee-for-service com-
plex cases treated under prospective payment in order to
mitigate the risk to providers of having their total costs
exceed the lump payment [11].
Research methods used to evaluate consequences of
physician payment methods
Regression analysis was used by two articles in the data-
base search. One used a pretest-posttest study design
[31], where one group is assessed at different time
points. The other used a retrospective cohort analysis
[32] where two groups are compared at the same time.
Qualitative research methods were employed by two
articles [37, 40]. Their study designs involved using lit-
erature reviews to inform a semi-structured interview
guide or surveying payers and conducting in-person in-
terviews with providers. To analyze the qualitative re-
sults, Greenapple [40] calculated the percentage
breakdown of participant responses. Two investigators
independently analyzed coded data in Elit and Cosby’s
study [37]. Then together they discussed themes and de-
veloped theory; the model that emerged from the discus-
sion was validated with two final interviews.
Regarding the creditability of study results in general:
the studies tended to be exploratory and not designed to
provide generalizeable results, but more than two thirds
of the articles performed at least some uncertainty ana-
lysis of their results.
Data sources used to evaluate consequences of physician
payment methods
Since the provider compensation method was often used
at the outset as an indicator dividing the sample into co-
horts or “treatment groups”, studies seldom included
payment method as an exogenous variable. Instead study
authors compared payment method cohorts using data
on utilization and expenditures [32] and on patient out-
comes and stakeholder opinion (collected through in-
person interviews and online surveys) [37, 40].
Results from the gray literature search
Multiple sources provide information on the ways that on-
cologists are paid in Canada. However, they do not investi-
gate the outcomes associated with the different payments
[10, 22, 29]. For example, the Canadian Institute for
Health Information’s (CIHI) National Physician Database
2012–2013 [10] includes payment information for medical
specialists, e.g., Fee-for-Service Clinical Payments to
Physicians by Province/Territory; oncology is one of the
specialties that comprise the medical specialist category.
Discussion
This review presents the literature’s key findings related
to the impact of different physician payment methods
and uncovers articles that examine those impacts in the
context of cancer care. This is important since the study
findings show that payment method impacts on cancer
care can run contrary to what would be expected in
other disease areas. For example, although Ellis [6]
showed that providers reimbursed via fee-for-service are
unlikely to discriminate for patient illness severity, Elit
[36] saw that oncologists reimbursed through fee-for-
service methods were substituting toward patients with
less complicated conditions since the fee levels were not
sufficient for treating cancer patients.
The Medicare program has been a leader in experiment-
ing with models of physician payment, but it has not fo-
cused on the area of cancer care [48]. Indeed this review
appears to be one of the first treating the impact of phys-
ician payment methods on cancer care. Its findings
emphasize the importance of further study of the impacts
of changing payment methods for the physicians who
focus on cancer care. The gray literature search shows that
the CIHI National Physician Database includes oncologist
remuneration information by province in Canada and
could be used as data source for future projects.
Cancer care tends to include high costs concentrated
at the end of life, when relatively low-cost palliative care
may be a more effective option, both financially and with
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regard to the patient’s quality of life. It is estimated that
the Medicare program spends one third of the cost of
treating cancer in the final year of a patient’s life and
78 % of that spending occurs in the final month [49].
Broomberg [33] argues that this is an expected result of
incentives in fee-for-service payment systems, which
reinforce doctors’ tendency to apply health care re-
sources inconsistently as they practice independently
with few systems in place for developing treatment pro-
tocols and practice reviews. It follows that the payers
queried in Greenapple’s [40] survey believe that re-
placing individual services with effective “bundles” of on-
cology care could bring down end-of-life costs while
also improving quality and reducing regional variation.
Workload, recruitment, and retention are all affected by
changes to physician payment models. Effects seem to be
magnified in the specialist context as their several extra
years of training lowers their supply to the system. Pay-
ment models that lead to poor retention of providers, for
example, if remuneration does not cover physician costs
as in the case of chemotherapy drug administration ser-
vices [35], may lead to heavy workloads which in turn
complicate recruitment. Also it has been noted that the
proportion of patients assigned “high-severity” status for
accounting purposes can be significantly reduced when
the workload of the discharging physician is increased,
resulting in a substantial revenue loss for the hospital [50].
However, few of the studies that focused on the specialist
context examined workforce factors such as these as out-
comes [37]. Clearly, future studies aiming to evaluate the
impact of changes to payment methods for oncologists in
Canada should include measurement and analysis of
changes in workload and workforce factors. Levels of hos-
pital utilization and expenditures/claims are obvious start-
ing points in areas where oncologists are primarily
employed by hospitals. Yet in addition to these general in-
dicators, payers may also be interested in changes in the
likelihood of adverse events since these can have direct,
predictable impacts on utilization and expenditure; hos-
pital readmission rates could be used to proxy for adverse
events. In terms of office-based oncologists, changes in
the number of tests ordered after patient consultations
could be examined. In both settings, conformity with
guidelines for evidence-based medicine is a way to evalu-
ate the impact of pay-for-performance payment systems.
It is also crucial to evaluate how much of the variation
observed after a new payment method’s implementation
should be attributed to factors other than that method.
A few studies took up this challenge. Kristiansen et al.
[39] report that the variables used in their analyses ex-
plain only 10 % of the observed variation in laboratory
utilization; as a result, they note that the main determin-
ant of test ordering behavior is probably the medical
condition. This emphasizes the necessity of conducting
studies in the cancer context: to discover factors that
drive cost, but can be changed while controlling for un-
changing disease complexity. It should also be noted
that two studies [14, 38] used random sampling while
others targeted a specific population and then included
all or most members of the population who agreed to
participate.
Many payers are experimenting with different payment
strategies. However, some study results may not be gen-
eralizeable to other contexts, either because of the re-
search methods or also the structure of the health
system studied. An example of structural difference is
the Taiwanese health system where doctors (including
those at the primary care level) are almost all employed
by hospitals [32]. Reforms instituted at the hospital level
may broadly affect physician behavior, but this will not
be the case in systems where doctors practice independ-
ently. Another example is in single payer context where
payment models may need to include specific reimburse-
ment for teaching and research services [36]. In multi-
payer systems, having several funding streams may make
these activities more likely to be funded by one of the
payers. As experimentation continues, we should re-
member that most studies report short-term effects of
payment system changes, but the longer term-associated
changes in technology use and practice structure may be
much larger in magnitude [51]. For example Finkelstein
[52] has shown that the implementation of Medicare in
1965, which caused a large increase in fee-for-service re-
imbursement, led to much larger effects on cost, tech-
nology use, and practice delivery over time than was
suggested by initial, static analyses.
This review experiences some methodological limita-
tions common to rapid literature reviews. The lack of a
systematic review process implies some study selection
bias. Although we evaluate the credibility of study find-
ings, we did not include a systematic quality assessment
process; it has been argued that forgoing such a process is
a source of bias in rapid reviews [53]. However, the body
of literature was so small that eliminating work based on a
quality rubric would likely have left us too little to review.
Another possible limitation is that we did not perform in-
duplicate data extraction and post hoc data extraction re-
view. Further, in the current policy environment, where as
noted above the MACRA legislation is overhauling
physician payment methods in the huge system of US
Medicare, rapid reviews have an advantage over systematic
reviews because they can be produced quickly to facilitate
evidence-based policymaking.
The review includes only articles published in English.
While limiting results in this way could omit Quebec-
specific results, prior research [54] shows that English-
language-restricted literature searches tend to have similar
results to those without language restrictions (when the
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review’s content is mainly based within published litera-
ture). A follow-up gray literature search could be expanded
to include French content.
Conclusions
This review presents currently published literature re-
lated to the impact physician payment method has on
cancer care. It shows that, although general impacts of
physician payment methods have been well-studied, re-
search has seldom been extended to the specialized cir-
cumstances of cancer care.
Nevertheless, several findings have implications for
decision-makers concerned with the impact of physician
payment systems on cancer care. Patients with high-
severity illnesses may receive too little treatment in bun-
dled payment systems that rely on patient diagnosis so it
may be prudent to invest in quality measurement pro-
grams when implementing these systems. Fee-for-service
payment models can also lead to too little treatment when
prices do not vary to account for patient status, e.g., when
a treatment is not complex in principle, but it is made so
by the overall poor health of the patient. However, we see
that even high levels of treatment are not necessarily a
corollary for quality of care, so even when fee-for-service
incentivizes the provision of too much treatment, it may
still need to incorporate quality measurement.
Cancer care is resource-intensive: technologies are ex-
pensive and treatments are time-intensive. The time is
right to evaluate outcomes that occur before and after
reforms to oncologist payment methods, for example,
BC’s recent move from fee-for-service to salary-based
payment. Others could leverage the results of this ex-
periment to avoid costly duplication. Recruitment and
retention rates should also be examined to further quan-
tify impacts of new programs; effects on research pro-
duction and teaching programs are also of interest.
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